Trump’s Realism in Action: Analyzing the Power, Populism, and Protectionism Behind Trump’s 50% Tariff on India

Empires fall, and the gravity of their fall pulls every ally a little closer to the void

It was the chilly winter of 1991. The communist flag of the Soviet Union was coming down, the world’s biggest superpower was breaking apart, and new nations were about to emerge. Russia, as a new country, was going to rise from the fragments of the USSR. The collapse of the Soviet Union was not only a shock for Russia itself, but an even bigger shock for India, whose earlier leaders had built an ambitious nation with the help of the USSR. The collapse of the USSR made the Liberalization, Privatization, and Globalization (LPG) reforms an inevitable necessity for India.The end of the bipolar world order created a geopolitical vacuum, which maken India to rethink . its foreign policy and economic strategy. In the absence of its traditional ally, India was pushed to seek new alignments, gradually shifting its orientation from East to West. This transition marked the beginning of a long-term strategic partnership with the United States, sustained for over two decades. The Indian economy, previously structured around a socialist model, now faced the practical challenge of survival in rapidly changing economic landscapes. The main reason behind the U.S. alignment towards India was its vast emerging market of nearly 1 billion people, which Washington saw as an enormous economic opportunity. India’s gradual shift from a closed, socialist-oriented economy towards a more capitalist, market-driven system acted as a catalyst in strengthening this alignment. Parallel to this, the rise of the People’s Republic of China during the same period created new strategic calculations.Drawing from classical International Relations theory, the situation reflected the dynamics of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, where the rise of one power threatened the dominance of another. In this context, the United States viewed India as a potential partner to balance China’s ascent, thereby avoiding a direct confrontation in the evolving global order. The United States saw India as the largest democracy in Asia, which naturally positioned it as a potential partner. India could serve as a counterbalance to China and contribute to the emergence of a multipolar Asia. In this strategic structure, there was no indication that India would pose a threat to the United States. However, in 1998, following India’s nuclear tests, the relationship between the two democracies experienced a complete breakdown and a period of isolation. for a significant anount of time. Yet, both nations soon recognized that strategic engagement was far more beneficial than isolation. From that point onward, from the Clinton administration to Obama and even Trump 1.0, successive U.S. leaders respected India’s strategic autonomy and emphasized promoting India as a regional power capable of countering China, thereby ensuring that U.S. hegemony in Asia remained intact.

The Rise of Populism: Trump’s Path to Power

The Trump’s rise in U.S. politics is best understood as part of a global wave of populism, which also facilitated the rise of Narendra Modi in India in 2014.. He mobilized voters through anti-elite rhetoric, appeals to national identity, and protectionist economic policies. Trump framed politics as a struggle between “the pure people” primarily the white working class and Middle America .and “the corrupt elite” liberal establishment and globalization supporters. Similarly, in 2014, Prime Minister Modi framed politics as a contest between the common people and the political elite, often derived from established political families. Trump’s slogans resonated with the immigration, and multiculturalism. His campaign relied heavily on identity-based appeals, including anti-immigration stances, the border wall, and the Muslim Ban, all constructed around the narrative of an “American identity under threat.” White nationalism and conservative Christian values became normative anchors of his coalition, reinforcing the cultural and ideological basis of his populist support. It was completely similar to PM Modi's campaign of 2014 in which used similar types of rhetoric and indentity based issues whether it was on nationalism or religions. Trump’s rise was also linked to the relative decline of U.S. hegemonic power in the face of China’s ascent and the rise of other adversaries nation or powers. This erosion of American dominance created fertile ground for Trump’s populist rhetoric and slogans such as “Make America Great Again” and “America First”, which acted as catalysts for mobilizing disillusioned voters. Rather than preserving the liberal international order, Trump sought to re-nationalize American power, thereby weakening U.S. global leadership.The international system tends to remain more stable when a single hegemon provides global public goods. After 1945, the United States played this role through the creation of institutions like the IMF, WTO, and the World Bank, thereby underwriting the liberal order. However, rising economic competition from the European Union and China, along with military overstretch and overspend in Iraq and Afghanistan, generated space for populist-nationalist leaders to challenge the costs of maintaining this order.

Trump’s radical moves during his first term demonstrated a shift from sustaining the liberal order toward pursuing short-term national gains at the expense of long-term global leadership. His tariff actions, for instance, can be read as an attempt to reclaimed American hegemony in limited domains and reverse economic decline. Yet, from an iR perspective, such mercantilist policies often accelerate relative decline by undermining trust and weakening international cooperation. The post-1945 U.S. rise as a hegemon was anchored in democracy, human rights, and globalization. By contrast, Trump’s embrace of nationalism, protectionism, and even sympathies with authoritarian regimes stood in sharp contradiction to the very foundations of U.S. leadership in the global order. Continuing the traditional foreign policy approach of the United States,

Trump’s worldview was strongly reflect the Offensive Realism, where states seek to maximize power and prioritize national interests above international norms

. This was evident in his decision to exit of US from the Paris Climate Agreement, his preference for bilateral deals where the U.S. could extract asymmetric advantages, and his tariff wars with China, the European Union, and India. These actions reflected the zero-sum logic of relative gains, where economic policy was seen as an extension of power politics. In Trump’s diplomatic understanding, even long-standing allies were considered “burdens” unless they contributed more financially to U.S. security commitments. In the economic paradigm, Trump’s ideas echoed neo-mercantilist thinking, where trade deficits were perceived as a weakness and surpluses as a measure of strength. His withdrawal of India from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme in 2019 aligns with this mercantilist logic, underscoring his belief that trade concessions without reciprocal benefits undermined American power.

America’s Tariff Approach in Global Trade

In recent years, globalization and free trade agreements,,such as NAFTA, China’s entry into the WTO, and the outsourcing of IT jobs to countries like India and Bangladesh contributed and causes to enormous job losses in U.S. manufacturing hubs. Between 2001 and 2011, an estimated 2.4 million jobs were lost in the United States due to these structural shifts. Trump’s tariff policies appealed to disillusioned voters by promising to “bring jobs back.” His 2016 campaign strategically targeted states hardest hit by deindustrialization. Tariffs, even if economically costly, functioned as a form of political weapon, they symbolized toughness against “unfair trade” and served as cultural reassurance that the U.S. would no longer be “cheated" by minor powers.s At the same time, it was widely acknowledged that certain domestic industries sponsored the Trump’s campaign - particularly steel, aluminum, and dairy sectors, which were heavily subsidized and sought expansion opportunities. In contrast, other influential sectors, such as technology, auto, and agricultural exporters, opposed tariffs due to their dependence on global supply chains. This reflects the two-level game dynamic , where international trade policy was deeply shaped by competing domestic constituencies. 

There's famous theory given by Robert Putnam Two level game theory which state that : any leader simultaneously operate at two levels ie. International level and Domestic Level the international level, leaders negotiate with foreign states, while at the domestic level, they must secure support from domestic constituencies and interest and so called pressure groups. A deal is only sustainable when it satisfies both levels. 

In the case of the United States, this framework helps explain Trump’s approach. Internationally, in case of India, he pressed for greater access for U.S. dairy, medical devices, and e-commerce companies. With China, he demanded a reduction in the trade deficit, stronger intellectual property protections, and fairer trade practices. Tariffs were strategically deployed as bargaining chips at the international level, aimed at extracting concessions abroad, while simultaneously signaling to his domestic core voter base that he was protecting American workers and industries. Domestically, Trump faced significant pressure from workers and farmers who demanded visible protection from globalization. His “win-set” :was narrow: any international deal had to demonstrate toughness abroad while simultaneously satisfying his electoral base at home. Tariffs fit this role perfectly. Even if they hurt certain sectors, they acted as a powerful political signal that Trump was fulfilling his campaign promises. By standing up to India or China, he presented himself as stronger than past “weak” leaders. The withdrawal of India from the GSP program in 2019, for example, had little impact on overall U.S. trade numbers. Yet, it carried symbolic weight, it,t signaled to U.S. dairy and medical device lobbies that Trump was protecting their interests, while reinforcing his broader populist narrative. A 2019 Pew survey revealed that 56% of Republicans supported tariffs even when warned of higher consumer costs, showing that tariffs resonated more as symbols of national strength than as rational economic policy.

U.S. Tariff Escalation Against India

From a realist lens, tariffs are not merely economic instruments but tools of coercive diplomacy. Trump’s decisions reflected an attempt to discipline India, its high tariff regime (50–150% on whiskey, motorcycles, and agricultural goods) was framed by him as an affront to U.S. economic primacy. In an anarchic world, even allies are not exempt from coercion when their behavior undermines power interests. Thus, tariffs were less about free-trade fairness and more about reasserting primacy in the bilateral relationship. Trump’s worldview was deeply mercantile, treating global trade as a zero-sum game where success meant a favorable balance. The U.S. ran a $24 billion deficit with India in 2017, which Trump repeatedly cited as evidence that India was exploiting the United States, often calling the bilateral relationship “one-sided.” Trump’s tariffs also fit into the logic of a declining hegemon. Facing China’s rise and mounting challenges to its economic dominance, the United States increasingly relied on coercive measures to sustain authority. By imposing some of the world’s highest tariffs on India, Trump projected that the U.S. would actively resist the erosion of its hegemonic status. In this sense, the tariff episodes became symbols of hegemonic anxiety-an attempt to slow the diffusion of economic power away from the .United States.

The Role of Leadership Personality in U.S.India Relations 

While realism stresses that “states act rationally,” political psychology reminds us that leaders are human beings subject to ego, misperceptions, and personal insecurities. Psychological shortcomings such as impulsiveness, narcissism, or hypersensitivity can distort policy away from rational state interests. In diplomacy, such deficits may turn manageable disputes into crises. 

Trump consistently viewed trade through a zero-sum, transactional lens. He repeatedly claimed that “America is losing” in trade with India, regardless of actual balances. This deficit reduced nuanced trade relations into personal wins and losses. The personalization of issues pushed him to act blindly, with little concern for broader geopolitical calculations. Imposing a 50% tariff was not just economic it was performative. Trump could claim in rallies that he was the “toughest on India.” These decisions revealed a personality-driven need for dominance rather than calibrated negotiation. In this mode of personalized deficit, he risked sacrificing two decades of partnership between the world’s largest democracies. His confrontational style made it difficult to recognize India’s sensitivities as a rising partner. Instead of “mutual gains” framing, as liberal institutionalism would predict, tariffs alienated even a friendly leader like Narendra Modi..

On the other side, Prime Minister Modi’s rise in Indian politics has been tied to projecting an image of national revival and personal strength. His brand is rooted in sovereignty and firmness at home. A leader who campaigned on the vision of a “New India” could not appear submissive to U.S. tariffs. This personality factor constrained Modi’s flexibility in bargaining. Like Trump, Modi values symbolic status, where public humiliation such as being framed as “taking advantage of the U.S.” or bowing down is intolerable. Modi’s political image depends on projecting firmness, and conceding visibly to Trump’s bullying style could erode his domestic authority. As a result, even minor trade frictions escalated into open conflict. Despite deepening U.S.-India ties, India refused to bow down. In international relations, prestige-sensitive leaders often overreact to symbolic slights. For Modi, this meant India had to respond visibly through diplomatic rebuttals, speeches in Parliament, and the threat of retaliatory tariffs. While India has not yet imposed retaliatory tariffs on the U.S., the possibility remains. Such gestures are less about material harm and more about safeguarding symbolic status and national pride.

Strategic Outcomes in the Indo-Pacific Context

The strain created by Trump Tarrif is clearly visible in india USA relationship as recently the PM visited the china after 7 years for the SCO summit. However, under the framework of Complex Interdependence Theory, these disputes are not existential. India and the U.S. remain bound by multiple channels defense exercises, intelligence-sharing, supply-chain cooperation and large dispora connect .,that cannot be undone by tariff politics alone. The Realism predict partners stick when a shared threat persists . And Washington and New Delhi both shared a common threat perception - China rise , maritime assertiveness and coercive economic practices . The tarrif are therefore best read as a shock event within a still converging partnership. they bruise trust, slow progress and raise costs but they do not fundamentally alter the balance of power logic that ties india and the USA together. As it mentioned earlier that india USA relationship are not uni-dimension, they span in various dimensions from the defence, intelligence to people to people ties. Even when the trade is disrupted, other domains (IT services, defense exercises, educational migration) continue functioning. This insulation act as a cushion, preventing collapse. Despite tariff frictions, the Indo-Pacific convergence has remained resilient. Both states face China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean, pressure on Taiwan and the South China Sea, and military coercion along the Himalayas. These shared security concerns have anchored cooperation beyond trade disputes. The idea of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” has emerged as a common narrative, with India’s SAGAR (“Security and Growth for All in the Region”) vision overlapping significantly with Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. This convergence reflects how strategic imperatives can override economic tensions in great-power politics.

Recalibrating Ties: Modi’s Engagement with China

India operating in a multipolar environment. The U.S. tariff war exposed a vulnerability: Washington cannot always be relied upon as a fully predictable partner. By visiting China after seven years, Modi signaled that India will not tie itself exclusively to the United States. India leverages China and the broader SCO and BRICS+ frameworks not out of trust in Beijing, but to demonstrate flexibility, enhancing its value in Washington’s eyes and increasing its bargaining power. This move reinforces India’s status as a swing state and reflects the realist concept of hedging avoiding overdependence on a single power by diversifying alignments. 

Neoclassical realists argue that foreign policy is shaped not only by structural factors, such as China’s rise and the U.S. tariffs, but also by domestic political needs and leader psychology. Modi’s domestic brand emphasizes strength and independence. A high-profile visit to China after the U.S. tariff episode allowed him to signal to the Indian public that “India has choices” and will not be dictated by Washington. This step aligns with both India’s hedging strategy and its domestic political imperatives. 

India’s traditional foreign policy has always emphasized multilateral engagement, whether in global governance or economic institutions. By reengaging China through platforms such as the SCO and BRICS, India signals that global governance is multi-institutional and not exclusively U.S.-centric. Even when bilateral issues with China remain unresolved, participation in multilateral forums strengthens India’s strategic hand. These institutions provide venues for selective cooperation in areas like energy and climate, insulating India from complete dependence on Washington. By leveraging alternative forums such as the SCO or BRICS, India expands its strategic space and avoids “forum capture” by U.S.-led institutions, such as the Quad. Economically, China and India are deeply interdependent, with India relying on China for critical goods like electronics and APIs. Modi’s visit to China therefore sends a paramilitary signal that, despite geopolitical rivalry, India cannot afford a total rupture. By maintaining channels with both the U.S. and China, India practices selective interdependence, extracting benefits from both without overcommitting to either. This strategy is further illustrated by India’s current role as Russia’s largest oil purchaser and its position as a major supplier of diesel to Ukraine.

Future Trajectories of India–U.S. Relations

In an anarchic system, states are power maximizers, and cooperation is temporary, driven primarily by self-interest. As India’s economy grows, it is increasingly likely to be seen as a rival rather than merely a partner in American eyes. U.S. history shows a pattern of discomfort with emerging economic peers, such as Japan in the 1980s and China in the 2000s. This projection becomes more salient as global reports indicate that by 2037 India may surpass the U.S. as the world’s second-largest economy. Trade disputes, such as the 50% tariff episode, are not aberrations but early symptoms of frictions that will intensify as India’s economic profile rises, especially if similar ideological governments continue in the White House. While China currently acts as the “strategic glue” sustaining India-U.S. cooperation, once China plateaus or U.S. strategic pressure eases, underlying economic competition could resurface sharply. Strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific may continue, but trade and economic rivalry are likely to sharpen, creating a “conflictual partnership” where the U.S. both courts and contains India.. The behavior of State is shaped not only by material interests but also by identity, norms, and narratives factors particularly vibrant in the U.S.-India case. The U.S. sees itself as the leader of the liberal international order, while India projects itself as an independent civilizational power emphasizing strategic autonomy and the vision of Vishwaguru. If India’s narrative of rising autonomy continues to harden, it will resist being treated as a junior partner, potentially escalating conflicts and clashing with U.S. expectations of alignment. Conversely, if both societies strengthen narrative of being natural democratic partner countering authoritarianism, the identity convergence may sustain cooperation even amid trade dispute. The symbolism of Modi's China visit shows that indentity is fluid: India can oscillate between the "partner of west" and "leader of Global South". If identities converge World largest democracies" cooperation deepens. If identities diverge India is autonomous Global South Leader Vs US as a order hegemon friction rises.

Concluding Analysis

India Conflict with the Trump Adminstration over tarrif, and the wider rhetorical battles that followed, highlight how economic dispute and personality driven prestige contests can starin even strategically aligned partners. Yet these friction exist within a larger structural reality: India's rise is not occuring in isolation, but within a global leader order where the United State remain the primary hegemon. Realist logic remind us that India's ability to project power in south Asia and the Indian ocean rest partly on US support through defense technology transfers , intelligence cooperation and diplomatic shielding against China and Pakistan. In recent times , USA current leadership shows some interest towards the Pakistan and their leaders but by and large it should considered as the individual interest of their leadership members.  Thus, India's hegemony in it's immediate region is real but conditional . It is Underwritten not only by India's material capabilities and diplomatic assertiveness, but also by continuing umbrella of UG global hegemony. As long as Washington views India as a central pillar in its Indo Pacific strategy, New Delhi's room for maneuver expands; if backing falters , India face sharper constraints from both China and regional stability.

"India is today is a regional hegemon, but it's a hegemon only so long as US hegemony back it's rise